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CONSPIRACY AND POWER POLITICS
John E. Guendling
Arkansas Polytechnic College
Ishould like to examine some first-magnitude concepts of political
theory in their constellation about a key concept, conspiracy, for the sake
of illuminating an ideal of integral democracy.
It should be recognized at the outset that the political conditions
which foster tendencies to conspiracy require some distinction from those
conditions in society which foster accusations of "conspiracy". To be
sure, an actual tendency to conspiracy furnishes occasion for the accusa-
tion; but the absence of the tendency does not preclude the accusation.
What seems to be required for an understanding of the disparity
is a study of the dynamics of political behavior which attends less to the
qualitative differences of ideology between the parties involved and
more to the quantitative disposition of their forces in the struggle for
power. The aim of such an approach should be to draw from the
equilibrations of political forces in a society what might be called
generalizations upon the dialectic of power politics".
The observations here essayed are, however, rather more pre-
liminary, their value being construed mainly in terms of their suggestion
of the fecundity for political theory of concepts ingredient in the ancient
tradition of dialectical philosophy.
The notions most men hold of "power" and "freedom" antecedent
to political reflection bear witness to the efforts of every thing living
to procure for itself a state of well-being. Such a state may be defined
as a favorable balance between intrinsically self-aggrandizing factors
and whatever extrinsic factors impose limitations on any thing's being.
Power, accordingly, in its pre-political aspect, is simply the positive,
self-integrating or substantive display of these intrinsic factors of
vitality, while freedom is the negative, dispersive or non-substantive
conception of the lack of obstacles to their operation. As positive and
negative sides of the same idea, both bespeak as common to every
organic being a striving to master and reduce its immediate environ-
ment to material upon which it can set its own characteristic form and
by means of which it can magnify its substance unchecked by alien
impositions.
Although the biological world is one which, at first glance, exhibits
universal conflict between unrestrained tendencies to self-aggrandize-
ment, the ecologist, is able to recognize standing patterns of irresolution
constitutive of so-called "balances" in nature.
***
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It was among the Greek natural philosophers of the Sixth Century
B.C. that generalized expression was first given to the idea that the
characteristic ways in which the dynamic components of nature equili-
brate their relations furnish paradigms for understanding the human
social order. This insight, traceable to Anaximander of Miletus, was
explicated in the thesis that justice and law exist first and foremost in
a cosmic state and only secondarily in human society, where they
furnish natural norms for human behavior. The assumption was that
there is an inherent order in nature, a self-enclosed, self-regulating
system of due proportions in the give and take among things, whereas
in human society, on the contrary, laws have been necessitated as
conscious contrivances for securing justice by their regulation of socially
conflicting claims.
The theory of "cosmic justice" of Heraclitus of Ephesus mirrors
the "state of nature" with metaphorical aptness: The world is made
up of "opposites" checking each other. Nothing gives check to itself.
Cosmic justice is, accordingly, the principle of equilibration between
all forces in being, monitoring their "strife" lest they overstep their
"natural limits".
I regard to the factions competing for power in any body politic,
Greek thought discerned a system of checks and balances, recognizing
in their operation but a special case of a natural, cosmic law. The
moral for mankind is expressed in an emphatic tendency in ancient
political theory, even among those thinkers who no longer stand
explicitly within the tradition of dialectical philosophy, as, e.g., Aris-
totle, Polybius and Cicero, to seek conscious compliance with such a law.
It is within this theoretical context that I wish to affirm, as being
of contemporary relevance, certain political apercus, starting with the
following as a working definition of "justice": Justice is that idea! of
an accepted norm defining the limits and arbitrating the occasions of
conflict among competing parties within any system of power-relations
in accordance with a principle which seeks to secure maximal stability
in the total system through maximal responsiveness to the shifting
balance of power among the competing parties.
?
No individual, institution or movement in society has a natural
tendency to give check to itself: That is, if you will, a law of primitive,
blind being.
If, notwithstanding, any entity acknowledges limits to what itmay
"lawfully"do, if it defers to any so-called "rights" of others or agrees
to give them their "just due", or if it formally subscribes to a system
of moral or legal rules of "fair play" among competing "loyal"
elements, it does so from a platform of acquired realism instructing
its view of the possible.
**
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Reciprocity, i.e., mutual toleration, interposes itself as a rule where
a division of power prevents unilateral rule: That is, as it were, a
law of nature, enlightened being.
Where a tradition of mutual guarantees, tolerance of differences
and equality before the law governs the administration of justice,
responsible majority and loyal minority share alike in a public conscience
binding them to common observances in the exercise of freedom. In
the measure that these observances extend to all forces competing in
the society, it exemplifies the definition of an integral democracy.
Under such a system the principle of checks and balances is no longer
simply a fact of life but becomes an avowed value directing the
several parties to common terms of constraint in their behavior.
If, accordingly, justice be conceived as a principle specifying the
terms of competition governing the political dialectic, it should be clear
that it will function effectively in this capacity only so long as all parties
stand truly "under" or "within" the dialectic, i.e., are unable to
manipulate the terms definitive of the conditions of competition to
their individual ends. Only so long may justice be said to be "impar-
tial" in its dispensations.
If, on the contrary, one faction is able to monopolize the positions
of power for any length of time, it reveals a resurgent primitive
tendency to stand "above" the dialectic, i.e., to make itself master of
the meaning of justice and arbiter of the mechanisms of arbitration.
Old balances may then be drastically upset as the spectrum of permissi-
ble allegiances shifts or contracts and hitherto "loyal" opposition groups
are "unmasked" and made to suffer the brunt of accusations of "con-
spiracy", "counter-revolution", "subversion", etc.
This is a tendency ever at work no matter who the parties or
what the claims of the system. Lord Acton's observation on the
tendency of power to corrupt and absolute power to corrupt absolutely
must count as a corollary to any dialectical theory of politics.
But individuals and groups lag in their adjustments at times,
failing to respond to new situations preemptorily in accord with the
dictates of real — or machtpolitik, precisely because they do have
consciences, private and public, which cannot overnight be remade.
Accordingly, abuses of power develop slowly or quickly depending on
a number of factors, including the nature or severity of the political
imbalance, the length and strength of the imperiled constitutional tradi-
tion (as the formal expression of the common consensus of justice), as
well as on characteristics peculiar to the contending factions themselves.
But peculiar ideological characteristics, whether of the attacking
or defending parties, I consider of least significance as genuine casual
agents in the curtailment of political freedom, even though action
against a disfavored group generally follows upon accusations designed
to establish a stereotype of disloyalty in terms of specific beliefs or
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practices — omitting from the bill of charges its real sin, namely, its
relative inability to fight back in the terms of pure power politics.
It may, indeed, be true for reasons at least partly doctrinal, that
a Catholic majority in this country would infringe upon the liberties of
other groups more readily than a similar Quaker majority. To this
extent, the peculiar "aggressiveness" of Catholics and "peaceableness"
of Quakers would be germane to understanding certain details of the
usurpatory process. But the burden of my thesis diminishes the signifi-
cance of such group differences before the fact that both groups, if
long able to escape the normal checks on power, would tend with
comparable avidity to meet harsh "justice" to their erstwhile loyal
opposition.
+
The ideal of integral democracy can be approximately realized
only where a hardy distrust prevails with respect to anyone's ability
long to resist the abusive seductions of power, a distrust much in
evidence among the founding fathers of the American constitutional
system. Its success is contingent on a continuing schooling in the basic
moral principle, the golden rule, of doing to others as you would
have them do to you. This principle is in radical opposition to the
power-political sophism of doing to others as they "actually" do to
you. For the latter readily results in a standard patterned upon a
conceit as to the disparity between our own and our neighbor's be-
havior,- it conveniently feeds our fancy of injury and threat, magnifying
their intolerability in nice proportion to the accumulation of power
whereby we can "appropriately" requite them.
The notion of "integral democracy" implies that whenever there
is a group in the policy which does not honor the common commitment
to justice the system is to that extent endangered in its integrity. Two
approaches suggest themselves by way of remedy: (1) Invocation of
sanctions against the offending group, including, in the extreme case,
proscription of its existence, and (2) employment of positive, system-
identifying stimuli to encourage it to acceptance of the common com-
mitment.
Before discussing remedies, however, it is necessary to weigh the
considerations which lend or deprive of credence the charge that a
group is breaking faith by resort to "conspiracy", "rebellion" or other
usurpations. To do so, one must examine the charge for its dialectical
significance, i.e., for what it means in terms of its tendency at the
time of imputation to affect the balance obtaining in a system of
power-relations.
Conspiracy implies dissimulation in the organization of an attempt
to command the legal order by illegal means and is obviously a breach
of the moral foundation of integral democracy. But it is not usually
the weak who so conspire, though due allowance need be made for
a quota of fools who cannot realistically assess the balance of power.
**
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Rather, as a genera! rule, the weaker a group the greater its recognition
of the wisdom of a strict observance on its part of the canons of
reciprocity. To be weak and at the same time obnoxiously radical is
to be doubly exposed, a tempting prey to those behind whose conspic-
uous asseverations of patriotic devotion there lurks the primeval instinct
for leaping at the jugular.
In the uncommon event that petty misguided groups conspire, a
society does well to exercise forebearance in letting the conspiracy
mature to a consciousness of its own futility, a state of mind affording
some possibility of self-redemption. Only where conspiracy plainly
issues in overt action damaging to law-abiding interests does the
urgency arise for punishment by the constituted authorities.
But honesty should compel the conclusion that, more often, the
dialectical significance of a charge that some numerically weak and
odious group is conspiring lies in what it evidences about the accusers
themselves — bearing as it does the tell-tale mark of psychological
projection — unwittingly witnessing to their own conspiring to rig the
system against a vulnerable adversary.
It is by regarding the strong that we discover the usual conditions
for conspiracy, as furnished by two contrasting possibilities: (1) Where
an out-group conspires against the government because the relations
of actual power are not accurately reflected in the legal distribution
of power and the system does not provide or use is not easily made
of a commensurating mechanism of redress, and (2) where the govern-
ment, i.e., the legal ruling-power, conspires against an out-group
because the former's actual power so exceeds its legal mandate as to
make feasible proceedings against that out-group through suspension
or revocation of its protections under the law.
A usurpation, i.e., the consequence of a successful conspiracy, takes
the form either of revolution or despotism, accordingly as the conditions
under (1) or (2) prevail.
"Revolution" implies drastic change, characteristically, but not
necessarily, attended by violence. What is dialectically significant
about a revolution is that its proponents justify it by reference to the
excesses of the government whose overthrow is sought, while pro-
ponents of despotism justify their repressions in turn by reference to
the subversive nature of the excesses implicit in the undertakings of
the opposition, excesses which render the latter "a clear and present
danger" to the security of the state, i.e., an intolerable threat to the
established balance of power.
It is not necessary for threats to be real in order to play on them.
For despotism constitutes an ingathering of power by methods which
naturally tend to evoke one set of threats in order to invoke another.
It is, indeed, from despotism's own excesses that its bugaboos derive
more than phantom power so as to congeal against its wishes a new,
***
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albeit now unconstitutional opposition which will endeavor to take its
dialectical measure.
Any group conspires out of a certain sense of alienation from
he existing order and its processes of justice. The weaker the group
he greater the possibility that positive inducements and adjustments
can be made to give it a sense of identification with the constitutional
governances of the system. The negative route, involving sanctions or
jroscription, is dangerous to employ against even the weakest group
and constitutionally fatal, if not in fact futile, when employed against
a major faction in the society.
The problem of abridging any group's legal right to operate is
always complicated by the fact that the group which spearheads the
effort to censure or suppress is not in the nature of the case a disinter-
ested party in the cause of justice. As a consequence, the unsettling
effect of the attendant displacements in power, he fears stimulated in
hose groups having questionable "affinities" to the banned group but,
above all, the witch-hunting spirit of inquiry engendered by resort to
jroscription as a device in waging politics create a condition of crisis
n the existing order which may well only be overcome by a despotic
sacralization of institutional forms at the price of a departure of the
iving spirit therefrom. That there is a pained awareness of these
endencies in some quarters of America today is due, in part at least,
o the scarcely allayed ghost of McCarthyism.
What is important, in summary, is that justice, as the defining
characteristic of any legal order, pendulates between two natural limits
or usurpatory extremes, revolution and despotism. It is at its optimum
or the greatest number of people when it returns, after minimal devia-
ions, to a certain mean.
Integral democracy, accordingly, represents a conscious attempt to
oster this condition of equilibrium by supporting the existence of various
ystem-stabilizing institutions at cross-power with one another and
erving to dampen dialectical excess. As such, it is the political coun-
erpart of an ethical conception, the golden rule, for the utility of the
atter is construed as residing precisely in its social tendency as the
prime agent for enforcement of a "golden mean".
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